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Instructions
Threat intelligence (TI) is evidence-based knowledge about an existing or emerging menace or hazard to IT
infrastructure that can be used to inform decisions regarding the subject's response to that hazard. This
knowledge can be processed by existing platforms for collecting security information and event
management. The goal of the thesis is to design and implement correlation algorithms for TI platform of
student's choice that would detect or visualize threats aiming at the managed IT infrastructure.
Tasks:
- Analyze the problem of TI and according to the analysis choose a suitable platform for integration and
describe the integration process.
- Design TI correlation algorithms for the platform.
- Integrate the correlation algorithms into the platform.
- Validate the integration in laboratory environment.
- Describe how the integration enhanced the detection of incoming threats capabilities of the selected
platform.
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Abstrakt
Práce se zabýva problémem threat intelligence. Je zde diskutován výběr
vhodné SIEM platformy a návrh korelačních algoritmů. Tyto algoritmy jsou
zaměřeny na detekci TOR, phishingu a ransomware. Součastí je popis návrhu
korelačních algoritmů a jejich integrace do zvolené platformy. Výsledné řešení
je testováno v laboratorním prostředí a výsledky jsou vyhodnoceny.
Klíčová slova cyber threat intelligence, splunk, SIEM, threat intelligence
management platform, TOR, ransomware, phishing
Abstract
This thesis focuses on the problem of “threat intelligence”. Selection of suit-
able SIEM platform and design of the correlation algorithms is discussed.
These algorithms aim at TOR communication, phishing and ransomware de-
tection. It includes design and description of the correlation algorithms and
their integration in the selected platform. The final results are validated in
the laboratory environment and are further evaluated and discussed.
Keywords cyber threat intelligence, splunk, SIEM, threat intelligence man-
agement platform, TOR, ransomware, phishing
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Introduction
Threat Intelligence is a knowledge that helps to identify security threats in the
IT infrastructure and to make informed decisions. That means decisions that
are based on facts or information. It is used by various security teams, includ-
ing chiefs information security officers(CISOs), security managers, security
incident response teams and members of security operation center team. This
group of people is responsible for the security of the organization and its cli-
ents. Their role is to protect the organizational IT infrastructure from internal
and external threats to ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability of the
information assets.
Currently, there is not out of the box free or open-source solution that
would utilize the threat intelligence in a way that makes it actionable. Ac-
tionable means that information value gained from threat intelligence can be
used to reduce or eliminate the risk of successful attack. Such solution should
be able to automatically collect, process, store, normalize, enrich and util-
ize threat intelligence data in order to improve and enhance the detection
capabilities of the organization. Utilization also means that this data will
be automatically correlated with various data sources that are present in the
organization as network communication, proxy data or even endpoint data.
This data includes logs and events produced by various devices like firewalls,
audit logs or proxy events.
This thesis wants to bring a concept that is based on tools that are open-
source or free for certain period of time and show how they can be integrated.
Moreover, it wants to utilize a specific set of correlation algorithms to make
the threat intelligence actionable. Described set of correlation algorithms is
focused on detecting risks that are trending in cyber security. Three topics
have been selected (TOR, ransomware, phishing). Early detection of these
threats can significantly reduce the damage. They are further discussed in the
thesis. This would help people who want to get into the threat intelligence
community to have something to start with. It would also help organiza-
tions that do not have threat intelligence program to have a solid foundation
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where they can start off. Organizations may take this concept and enhance
it with correlation algorithms that are critical for their operations and busi-
ness. Academia can use it for doing further research in the threat intelligence
field by having an open solution that can utilize and make threat intelligence
actionable.
This thesis describes the problem of threat intelligence. It is a relatively
new field, therefore the basic terminology, closely related terms and problem
statement is described in the analysis chapter. The analysis also describes
the current state of the art in the field of threat intelligence and the com-
mon platforms used in the industry. Furthermore, threat intelligence cycle
model is analyzed and requirements on the proposed solution/platform are
discussed. According to the analysis, a suitable platform is selected. Correl-
ation algorithms that would enhance the threat detection capabilities of the
selected platform are discussed as well in this chapter.
Detailed design of the proposed solution/platform is described in the design
chapter. Furthermore, use cases that suit as a basis for the design of the
correlation algorithms are also described in the design chapter. These use
cases are used to enhance the threat detection capabilities.
The process of the integration and implementation of the correlation al-
gorithms into the selected platform is described in the realization chapter.
There are also described and detailed various approaches and techniques and
their performance is measured and compared.
The results are validated in the laboratory environment. This is described
in the testing chapter.
2
Chapter 1
Analysis
This chapter defines what threat intelligence is, where does it come from, how
it can be processed and then used to enhance detection of threats aiming at
the organization. Furthermore, it defines threat intelligence cycle, an abstract
model that is important in the utilization of threat intelligence. Platforms
that play a key role in this cycle are then defined, described and proposed.
1.1 Threat Intelligence
Threat Intelligence is a young field. By measuring a number of academic pub-
lications containing keyword cyber threat intelligence until 2010 was about 20.
Currently, the number of all academic publications containing this keyword
has increased to 676 from which 475 has been published in last 2 years accord-
ing to scholar.google.com using the keyword “cyber threat intelligence” (see
Figure 1.1).
Threat Intelligence is a consequence of cyber security incident response
teams and governments agencies need to share information about cyber threats.
The cyber threat is a possibility or malicious attempt to damage or disrupt a
computer network or system [5]. Disrupting means any unauthorized change
in confidentiality, integrity or availability of the information asset (see CIA
principle [6]). Currently, many vendors and security practitioners have dif-
ferent opinions on how to define threat intelligence. For the purpose of this
thesis, terms and concepts are defined that are later used in the thesis.
First, let’s define the terms intelligence and Threat Intelligence and how
they can be represented and categorized. Federal Bureau Investigation defines
intelligence as [7]:
Intelligence is information that has been analyzed and refined so
that it is useful to policymakers in making decisions—specifically,
decisions about potential threats to national security.
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Figure 1.1: Number of academic publications containing keyword “cyber
threat intelligence”; Source: scholar.google.com
Putting this definition together, Gartner defines threat intelligence as [8]:
Threat intelligence is evidence-based knowledge, including con-
text, mechanisms, indicators, implications and actionable advice,
about an existing or emerging menace or hazard to assets that can
be used to inform decisions regarding the subject’s response to that
menace or hazard.
Gartner defines threat intelligence in the context of IT infrastructure.
Analogy can be used to better understand threat intelligence in the context.
Let’s define three types of threats:
• Known Knowns
• Known Unknowns
• Unknown Unknowns
Unknown Unknowns describe a situation where the organization is not
aware of threats that it is facing. Let’s imagine a situation where the shop is
going to be robbed by a thief waiting outside. There is no awareness of the
threat, neither of the context when and how it is going to happen. Known
Unknowns describe a situation where there is threat awareness but it is not
known, when and where it happens. Using the same analogy, blackmailing
letter was received, knowing the shop will be robbed but it is not known when
and how. Preparation is possible but efficiency is limited. Known Knows
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describe on the contrary situation where there is threat awareness and context
is known. Using the same analogy – information has been received from the
police that there will be an attempt on the robbery of the shop in the night
by pick-locking the back entrance.
Moving from Unknown Unknowns to Known Knowns is a threat intelli-
gence [1]. This will allow a user or an organization to better prepare for cyber
threats and improve their security posture. In cyber security, most of the
organizations are aware of threats but they lack contextual knowledge about
it. This is due to the fact that currently attackers are using more sophistic-
ated methods and exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities [9, 10]. These types of
attacks are usually done by botnet campaigns that are leveraging the same
approach for multiple targets, also known as un-targeted attack [11]. If it
is known, counter-measures can be prepared to protect the asset against the
threats before they happen.
Most of the security experts share the same belief that Threat Intelligence
is only and only if that information is actionable [2]. Actionable means that
information value gained from threat intelligence can be used to reduce or
eliminate the risk of successful attack [12, 13]. In the shop robbery imagined
situation, a stronger lock and security cameras will be bought to reduce mo-
tivation and efficiency of the threat actor. In the cyber security field, threat
actor can be prevented from malicious attempts by blocking him on the peri-
meter or reduce the detection time in case of insider threats. The insider
threat is such a threat that comes from the inside of the organization. That
includes accidental, negligent or malicious behavior by the employee [14].
To better understand what this thesis is focusing on, subtypes of threat
intelligence need to be defined.
1.1.1 Subtypes
Any information that can inform decision should be considered as threat in-
telligence [1]. From reading news informing about hackers exploiting new
security flaw to a colleague informing about raised number of phishing emails.
Based on the way how this information can be handled and who is the aimed
consumer, several subtypes are defined:
• Strategic Threat Intelligence
• Operational Threat Intelligence
• Tactical Threat Intelligence
1.1.1.1 Strategic Threat Intelligence
Strategic Threat Intelligence is a high level information consumed by non-
technical people like board directors or chiefs information security officers(CISOs)
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in the organization. It focuses on long term use. This can include current
attack trends, motivations, financial impact and what type of organizations
are being targeted from academic institutions to financial organizations like
banks. This information might include who is likely to be the attacker includ-
ing hacker groups, hacker activists or governments and how well resourced
they are. This can drive organization decision regarding security counter-
measures and areas with heightened focus. Currently, strategic threat intel-
ligence is shared in a form of reports, briefings or conversations. However,
strategic threat intelligence can be gained with data-mining sites that are
used by threat actors, commonly dark-net or deep-net websites [15,16].
1.1.1.2 Operational Threat Intelligence
Operational Threat Intelligence is a high level information with focus on short-
term usage. It is consumed by security managers or threat hunting leads to
identify current risks and threats. It includes information about upcoming at-
tack including vectors like who, how and when it is going to launch an attack.
Operational threat intelligence is mostly possessed by national governments
as it requires extensive monitoring of hacker groups. However, organization
might get such information if an attack is prepared by hacking activist and in-
formation is publicly available. Annual report from security vendors, security
experts analysis or anti-virus companies statistics are all forms of operational
threat intelligence. It can be, however, gained with manual analyst work scan-
ning and infiltrating various hacking forums, including dark-net or deep-net.
As well as strategic threat intelligence, operational threat intelligence can be
gained using the same mining techniques [15,16].
1.1.1.3 Tactical Threat Intelligence
Tactical Threat Intelligence is often referred to as tactics, techniques and pro-
cedures (TTPs). It has multiple subtypes itself, which is in threat intelligence
community often referred to as pyramid of pain.(see Figure 1.2) [17]. On the
contrary it is a low-level information consumed by incident response teams
and security operations center analysts. Top 3 levels of the pyramid informs
about tactics, techniques, procedures and tools that attackers have used before
in another organization. It is likely that same approach will be used again. In
hypothetical scenario, unspecified hacker group has used malicious software
tool and exploited vulnerable web server in order to gain access. Privileges
have been escalated, malware downloaded from remote command and con-
trol server and encryption of the data have been launched. Bottom 3 levels
of the pyramid describe data that have been leveraged in the research. It
includes IPv4 addresses, fully qualified domain names and uniform resource
locators(URLs) that are considered as malicious and have been present in ma-
licious attacks before. This is in computer forensics also known as indicator of
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compromise [18–20]. Tactical Threat Intelligence is collected in various ways.
Honeypot is a device that simulates activity of other systems like web, email
or file server [21]. Cybersecurity researchers examine files collected by these
sensors and if a malware is found, signature is created. Emails and URLs
of webpages are investigated either manually from a honeypot catch or using
scanners to look for sites that are compromised by malware or used directly
by threat actors as phishing websites [22]. Another form of sharing such data
is community driven sharing where users can submit, verify and share cyber
threat intelligence data. Descriptions next to the pyramid of pain are express-
ing how difficult it is for the attacker to use evading technique to change her
indicator of compromise.
Figure 1.2: Pyramid of pain describes different types of indicators of com-
promise and the level of effort for the attacker to modify its indicators of
compromises
Problems that had to be addressed in Tactical Threat Intelligence are
detailed in the following text.
1.1.2 Sources
Where does the threat intelligence come from? Every source that can provide
information that informs decision is considered as potential source of threat
intelligence [1]. Based on the high-level location of the source, several source
types are defined [23,24]:
• Internal Threat Intelligence
• External Threat Intelligence
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1.1.2.1 Internal
Internal threat intelligence is an information that comes from an experience of
the organization itself. It combines knowledge of what is protected and what
attacks happened in the past to create an actionable intelligence that will help
organization to better protect against the same threat in the future. Starting
from immature sharing via email up to mature solutions where such an info
can be collected and managed centrally.
1.1.2.2 External
External threat intelligence is on the contrary an information coming from
external sources. These data are called threat intelligence feeds. Providers of
these feeds are government agencies, security vendors or community driven
platforms. This thesis focuses on leveraging community driven information.
These are also known as open source feeds which doesn’t require paid sub-
scription like most of the commercial feeds managed by vendor or agency.
Most of the open source community feeds offer only data from the bottom 3
levels of the pyramid of pain (see Figure 1.2). Therefore in this thesis it was
not possible to utilize threat intelligence from the higher levels.
1.1.3 Data representation
Data representation describes how threat intelligence data are categorized and
several subtypes are defined:
• Structured
• Unstructured
These subtypes also define complexity of ingestion and utilization. Natural
language or any form of unstructured data is difficult to fetch, parse and
therefore utilize in automatized manner. On the other hand, threat intelli-
gence provided in structured format is more suitable for automation as rules
for their collection and storage can be built.
1.1.3.1 Structured
Structured threat intelligence is data that is formatted in a structured manner.
Threat intelligence providers are using various formats to describe indicators
of compromises (IoC) [25]. Most common types are file hashes, also known as
signatures and reputation data on domains and IP addresses that have been
associated with malicious activity. From an experience, most used formats
are JSON, CSV or XML. MITRE organization has tried to standardize a way
for such data using formats as CyBOX or STIX [26]. These formats have
ability to describe not only indicators of compromise but also more complex
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threat intelligence as tactics, techniques, procedures and tools (see Figure 1.2).
However, they are not heavily used in community driven feeds as their format
complexity makes it difficult to automatically create, share and consume this
data.
1.1.3.2 Unstructured
Unstructured threat intelligence is data that does not follow any structure
or convention. It includes email communication, twitter posts or community
forum posts. It is a complex problem to parse unstructured data as it con-
tains informal language and structure. Most of the strategic and operational
threat intelligence is unstructured. It is due to the nature of the strategic and
operational threat intelligence and its focus.
This thesis was focused on utilizing structured threat intelligence as the
primary and only source. Utilization of the unstructured threat intelligence is
a complex problem that is outside of scope of this thesis. However, attempts
to collect certain type of unstructured data have been made and reader can
find them here [15,16,27].
1.2 Threat Intelligence cycle
Threat Intelligence cycle is a model that is commonly used when building an
effective threat intelligence program.
It is important to note that various books and security experts may have
a different naming convention for the threat intelligence cycle [1,22,23]. After
the research, selected naming convention was chosen as it is the most suitable
representation for this thesis(see Figure 1.3) [1].
This model has 5 main areas that help to demonstrate the process neces-
sary for building an effective usage of threat intelligence:
• Requirements
• Collection
• Analysis
• Production
• Evaluation
1.2.1 Requirements
First stage in the cycle is definition of requirements and goals that are going
to be achieved by using threat intelligence. Following steps in the threat
intelligence cycle are based on the requirements that are defined in this step.
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Figure 1.3: Threat Intelligence Cycle and its stages [1]
Planning on how these data will be leveraged also takes place in this stage.
This is usually defined by the security team leaders or organizational needs.
In this thesis, requirements are to design a correlation algorithms for selected
platform to enhance detection capabilities of that platform utilizing threat
intelligence data. These requirements transform into a set of use cases that
are made of correlation searches. Furthermore, author selected scalability as a
requirement to enable scalable development based on this thesis. Architecture
and design must be done in a way allowing further enhancements in the future.
1.2.2 Data collection
Second stage of the cycle is data collection. In this phase threat intelligence
sources needs to be selected to fulfill defined requirements. This thesis focuses
on threat intelligence that is reusable and publicly available. As internal
threat intelligence contains confidential data, external threat intelligence was
leveraged. This consists of multiple phases:
• Threat intelligence feed selection
• Fetching
In the threat intelligence feed selection part must be selected what feeds
need to be collected. They need to be collected from various open-source
feeds because private or commercial threat intelligence feeds required paid
subscription. Therefore they were not leveraged in this thesis. It is important
to note that private feeds usually offer feed with higher quality as they have a
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team of analysts and threat hunters that collect, submit, analyze and validate
data. Providing such feed is their primary business. There are many open-
source feeds but blind selection would be a mistake. It needs to be known
what sort of data is collected in such a feed and how it is maintained. Is the
feed removing data that is no longer valid? How often and how many data
is added? Is data in the feed overlapping with another feed? These are the
questions that need to be answered before it is decided to collect the data
from this particular feed. Another important factor is a knowledge of what
kind of threat intelligence data is the feed gathering. This is again reviewed
against the requirements that were defined. Reader can find further research
on open-source feeds in the following publication [28].
In the second phase, a fetching process needs to be setup. This process
will regularly download and update content from various feeds and make sure
that data in our platform is up to date. It is usually done using simple HTTP
methods or via Application programming interface (API).
The output of this phase is raw threat intelligence data collected from
selected threat intelligence feeds. This output serves as input to the following
stage – analysis.
1.2.3 Analysis
In the analysis stage raw data is being collected from the selected threat in-
telligence feeds. Collected data feeds from various sources are in different
formats as JSON, XML, CSV, STIX or in a custom structure. In order to
leverage all of them in one platform, they need to be parsed and modeled into
a common format in order to be used later in the production phase. Indicators
of Compromise (IoC) must be extracted from the threat feeds and normal-
ized. One goal of the normalization process is to organize newly collected
data in a way that only unique indicators are collected and stored in order
to avoid duplicates. Indicators of Compromise, like IPv4 addresses must be
stripped of values that are irrelevant as private network addresses defined in
RFC 1918 [29]. In this phase custom tags are applied to different sources to
apply context that will be used in the production phase. There is a contex-
tual difference if the mentioned indicator in the feed represent IP address of
command and control server that malware uses to get commands or if the IP
address was reported for a phishing campaign that was delivered from this
particular address. In the case of MD5 hashes, they could represent hash of
the certificate that was used in the malicious campaign as well as hashed sig-
nature of the malware. Custom confidence must be added to the processed
threat intelligence to represent trustworthiness of the selected data feed pro-
vider. Furthermore, analysis stage serves for threat feeds enrichment. That
means taking an existing indicator with all it is properties and enrich it with
new knowledge or even derive a new indicator based on the original one. For
example, an IPv4 address can be enriched with the geo-location. Specific en-
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richment methods are applied based on the maturity of the tool or platform
used in the analysis stage. It is further detailed in the section 1.6.2. This
analysis phase is essential for the functionality as it converts raw data into a
normalized set of threat intelligence data that will be used in the production
stage.
1.2.4 Production
Production stage is leveraging threat intelligence data that has been defined,
collected and normalized in the previous phases of the threat intelligence cycle.
The goal of this stage is to fulfill requirements, implement the solution and
utilize the data in the production environment.
1.2.5 Evaluation
Last stage serves for evaluation of the requirements defined in the first stage.
It points what was done right and what could be done better. This regular
feedback allows to continuously develop cyber threat intelligence program.
Right after the evaluation stage the cycle is repeated using the new or adjusted
requirements. In this thesis one full cycle has been done and evaluation stage
is provided in the conclusion.
1.3 Security Information and Event Management
Security Information and Event Management, also known as SIEM is a tool
used to collect all security relevant data in a centralized system in order to
correlate events from various security devices to enhance detecting and mon-
itoring capabilities. Gartner defines SIEM as [30]:
Security information and event management (SIEM) techno-
logy supports threat detection and security incident response through
the real-time collection and historical analysis of security events
from a wide variety of event and contextual data sources. It also
supports compliance reporting and incident investigation through
analysis of historical data from these sources. The core capabilit-
ies of SIEM technology are a broad scope of event collection and
the ability to correlate and analyze events across disparate sources.
Advantages of SIEM tool include log management, data aggregation, abil-
ity to correlate data, alerting and data visualizations capabilities. However,
this advantages comes with a high price tag.
Goal of this thesis is to enhance threat detection capabilities utilizing
threat intelligence, therefore security event and incident management tool
needs to be leveraged to correlate threat intelligence data across disparate
sources. SIEM tool is acting in production and evaluation stage.
12
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1.4 Threat Intelligence Management Platform
Threat Intelligence Management Platform is a knowledge base to store threat
intelligence information. It has the ability to automatically collect, aggregate
and normalize threat feeds. This platform is acting in data collection and
analysis stage of the threat intelligence cycle.
This platform can be represented with a vendor-based solution which then
provides external API access to the platform to access threat intelligence data.
Commercial platforms often have integration with popular security informa-
tion and event management tools that are largely used in enterprise security.
The advantage is that commercial solutions have large teams of security ex-
perts that can do advanced analytics and maintain high quality of the threat
intelligence feeds gained internally or via private paid feeds. However, the
disadvantage of such solution is a high price and low visibility into the data
collection and analysis stages of the threat intelligence cycle that are outside
of the user control. Such vendors include Recorded Future1
However, in this thesis, open-source solutions were leveraged to suit re-
quirements for Threat Intelligence Management Platform. This allows further
research based on an open platform which may lead to the enrichment of the
cyber threat intelligence community.
1.5 Utilization
Goal of this section in this thesis is to analyze actionability of the threat
intelligence and analyze what use cases will be utilized. They are later imple-
mented in the form of correlation algorithms that will enhance the detection
capabilities.
Currently, there are commercial or open-source solutions that solve one
or two stages of the threat intelligence cycle. However, for an organization
to fully benefit from threat intelligence, a full cycle should be implemented.
Having properly collected threat intelligence data without context or proper
actionability is limiting the efficiency if any. Actionable means that informa-
tion value gained from threat intelligence can be used to reduce or eliminate
the risk of successful attack [2, 12, 13]. Organizations may tie and integrate
these stages together, however, it is a complex problem that requires cooper-
ation of multiple teams and resources, human or financial. Only very mature
organizations have fully implemented a threat intelligence program.
In the research and survey done by SANS organization [2], the reader
can find more information about problems that are organization facing in the
threat intelligence field. On the question, “What is holding your organiza-
tion back from achieving integrated CTI capabilities?”2, organizations have
1https://www.recordedfuture.com/
2CTI means Cyber Threat Intelligence
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responded accordingly (see Figure 1.4 [2]). This can be interpreted as that
organizations have the interest in having cyber threat intelligence program.
Because there is not “one fits all” solution or commonly used standards, it
makes the problem of integration complex. Therefore it requires knowledge
across different fields supported by quality staff. More information about who
and how is using cyber threat intelligence can the reader find here [2].
Figure 1.4: SANS - Limitations in the cyber threat intelligence implementa-
tion [2]
This thesis wants to bring a concept that is based on tools that are open-
source or free for certain period of time and show how they can be integrated
and utilize a specific set of use cases to make the threat intelligence actionable.
Organizations may take this concept and enhance it with use cases that are
critical for their operations and business.
Use case may have different meanings in different IT fields, in this thesis
use case is understood as a logical, actionable and reportable component of
the security information and event management system (SIEM). It can have
a form of a rule, alert or visualization.
Use case selections for this thesis were consulted with the global secur-
ity experts from Splunk during their video-conferences, security researchers
presenting on BlackHat 2016 conference and security experts from Accenture
Security that are doing security assessments in all areas of IT Security. That
includes penetration testings, hardware and software security, incident re-
sponse, security monitoring, advanced analytics and threat intelligence itself.
These use cases address the current issues and trends in the cyber security
industry while leveraging threat intelligence data. These use cases are put
into three categories:
• The Onion Router traffic
• Ransomware
• Phishing
14
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1.5.1 The Onion Router traffic
The Onion Router, also known as TOR is a project that provides its users
anonymity online [31]. It is used in countries where the internet is censored
to avoid detection or to access sites that are normally blocked.
However, it is often used by threat actors to hide their tracks. Furthermore,
it can be used by malicious software in different stages of the attack. In recent
years, botnets have been found to be controlled through TOR network [32,33].
It is not only these external threats as a reason for monitoring and detect-
ing TOR traffic. Usage inside the organization should be forbidden as it can
serve for data exfiltration or viewing a malicious content.
TOR itself is not an indicator of a threat, but in the context of the or-
ganization, outgoing traffic through the onion router network could indicate a
rogue employee or a malicious code trying to communicate with its command
and control server. It is not unusual that it is against the company policy to
use TOR on their laptops. Therefore such communication should be always
detected and investigated.
Incoming traffic from TOR network can be the indication of malicious
attempts in a phase of reconnaissance but also in delivery, exploitation, in-
stallation or command and control [3, 34,35](see Figure 1.5).
It is extremely difficult to distinguish TOR traffic from normal traffic as
it also uses standard ports used for web communication [31].
1.5.2 Ransomware
Ransomware has become popular among attackers as a method to collect
profit [36]. Ransomware is a malicious software that is usually delivered via
exploit kits or phishing campaigns and leverage vulnerability in the software
to run it is own malicious code and encrypt files on the victim machine [37].
To decrypt files back, the attacker demands a ransom paid in the untraceable
currency as for example bitcoin [37,38]. Some types of ransomware have even
used TOR to communicate back to the server of the attacker [37]. In the
recent years, serious organizations like hospitals or universities have become
victims of some ransomware, which resulted in financial damage [39].
Organizations might be using a various software solution such as anti-virus
or next generation firewalls to protect against those threats, however, it seems
that it is not enough [10].
1.5.3 Phishing
Phishing is a fraudulent attempt to obtain sensitive information as usernames,
passwords or credit card details. It is usually delivered via email or websites
and it uses social engineering to trick the victim. Fake content is trying
to convince the user to click on the link with malicious content, open the
attachment or to enter his private information [21].
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Figure 1.5: Cyber kill chain according to Lockheed Martin [3]
These use cases were selected as phishing campaign is often the point of
the infection. It may deliver ransomware or any malicious software.
Some organization use external commercial tools that use their own threat
intelligence feeds to inform about potential risky sites or links. In recent years,
even company like Google has implemented their anti-phishing filter that use
threat intelligence to protect the user against this threat. Early detection
of users that have visited such site can reduce further damage and minimize
potential risks.
1.6 Platform proposals
In order to utilize and integrate the full threat intelligence cycle, Security
Information and Event Management platform and Threat Intelligence Man-
agement platform are selected. They play key roles in this thesis, as they offer
capabilities that are described in the threat intelligence cycle. Threat Intelli-
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gence Management Platform has the capability for data collection and analysis
stage of the cycle whereas SIEM tool can serve for the production and eval-
uation stage (see Figure 1.6). Principles used in the threat intelligence cycle
are, however, not platform specific. Platform selection is present to enable
design and implementation of those principles in the full threat intelligence
cycle and to provide proof of concept that can be evaluated.
Figure 1.6: Threat Intelligence Cycle – stages highlighted in red are implemen-
ted in Threat Intelligence Management platform whereas stages highlighted in
green are implemented in SIEM platform
1.6.1 Security information and event management
To accomplish what was defined in the requirements stage, a platform where
correlation algorithms take place must be chosen. The selected platform must
have data correlation capabilities. Data correlation capability allows to effi-
ciently search data patterns across various data sources. It also enables to filter
and transform this data and enable the creation of new correlation searches to
extend its capability. Security Information and Event Management tools offer
these capabilities and are used in organizations for monitoring and detection
of security incidents.
As Threat Intelligence Management platform is used for data collection,
normalization and enrichment, the selected platform must be able to integrate
with such platform. Selected platform must handle big-data in real-time as
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early detection is a key to reducing the damage [40]. The selected platform
must be publicly available so further extension or development by the com-
munity can happen. Ideally, it would also provide first hands-on experience or
documentation for users as security event and management tools are usually
very complex platforms. To sum up, requirements for the selected platform
are:
• Security Information and Event Management platform with ability to
integrate with Threat Intelligence Platform
• Modular platform with ability to handle big-data
• Documented and publicly available
Principles designed in this thesis should be developed and used on a plat-
form that is widely used in organizations to broaden the potential usage. As
there are many SIEM tools on the market and it would be a research topic it-
self to evaluate each one, Gartner research in Security information and Event
management platforms is leveraged. Strategy for platform selection was to
start with the leading platforms in SIEM according to Gartner [4,41](see Fig-
ure 1.7). Secondly, requirements for the selected platform as well as listed
advantages and disadvantages are evaluated.
Main leaders for this industry are Splunk, IBM, LogRhytm and next runner-
ups are HPE and Intel Security [4]. All of these leading SIEM tools are com-
mercial products, however, only Splunk offers publicly available free 60-day
full feature version of their tool that can be extended for developers [42–44]
Regardless, both IBM QRadar and Splunk offers modular structure, which
allows developers building new use cases and integrations. Documentation is
available for both platforms, however documentation for Splunk is much richer
based on the consultations with security experts that have both experiences
with Splunk and IBM QRadar. From the Splunk, IBM, LogRhytm tools which
are industry leaders, Splunk was the preferred platform. Based on the author
experience and the available documentation, it allows him to efficiently design
architecture, integration and new correlation searches. Splunk is also able to
handle big-data in real-time.
Therefore, Splunk platform was selected as Security Information and Event
Management platform and is further leveraged in this thesis. Splunk user in-
terface for data interaction is mainly composed of the search bar, sidebar,
and events (see Figure 1.8). Search bar serves for writing commands that are
then translated to REST API calls to retrieve, filter and transform data into
statistics or visualizations. Sidebar displays extracted fields with their corres-
ponding values and events show either the resulting events from the search bar
or statistics depending on the nature of the used command. Timeline simply
puts the event timestamps into visual form.
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Figure 1.7: Magic Quadrant for Security Information and Event Management
displaying where SIEM platforms stands according to their ability to execute
and the completeness of vision [4]
1.6.2 Threat Intelligence Management Platform
Security Information and Event Management tool was selected for its detec-
tion and monitoring capabilities that can be extended using threat intelligence.
Selection of platform that can handle collection, storage, normalization and
enrichment of the threat intelligence feeds is essential to fulfill the threat intelli-
gence cycle. There are several open-source platforms with these abilities [45].
After the consultations with the experts in the threat intelligence industry
and further research [46], Collective Intelligence Framework, also known as
CIF was selected. It is an open-source framework developed by REN-ISAC
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and is used to collect, store, normalize and enrich threat intelligence data.
Other open-source solutions include Malware Information Sharing Platform3
and CRITs: Collaborative Research Into Threats4
Collective Intelligence Framework is out-of-box shipped with enrichment
capabilities. To understand what type of enrichment is taking place, source
code have been reviewed and analyzed.
For the threat intelligence feeds and requirements defined in the threat
intelligence cycle, four types of enrichment took place:
1. Enrichment of the URL
2. Enrichment of the FQDN
3. Enrichment of the Subdomains
4. Enrichment of the IP
Enrichment is a process where a certain indicator is taken and new in-
dicators are derived based on the existing one. This is best explained on a
practical example:
This is a common URL http://fit.cvut.cz/student/magistr/DP-a-SZZ that
can be used as an indicator if a phishing or malicious activity was reported
on this URL. How can be this URL enriched ? If assumption are made, it is
possible to say that if this URL is malicious, then the whole FQDN5, which is
fit.cvut.cz is malicious. The same assumption is made for the subdomain. If
fit.cvut.cz FQDN was malicious, is cvut.cz malicious as well ? At this point
two FQDN are available. They can be further enriched by doing a nslookup6 to
find IP addresses that are hosting those FQDN. Another assumption is made
that if the fit.cvut.cz was malicious, then the whole server with particular IP
address hosting this domain is malicious.
However, for every level of assumption, confidence must be lowered because
it is still only assumption which might or might not be correct. Therefore
for every level of assumption that derive the original indicator, confidence is
lowered.
1.7 Test environment
Test environment serves as a validation tool for correlation algorithms. Con-
sidering the fact that solution should improve security posture and threat
detection capability, usage of data that is as close as possible to the data that
3https://github.com/MISP/MISP
4https://github.com/crits/crits
5fully qualified domain name
6https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb490950.aspx
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will be used in production environment is the desired approach. Therefore
two disjunct approaches are proposed.
First approach will be integration of test data that is captured in pro-
duction environment. This data will require approvals to use and must be
anonymized to prevent disclosure of sensitive information. This will have a
positive impact on evaluation and validation of the solution as captured data
are from the production environment.
On the other hand this can have negative impact on certain use cases as
they might not be present in the captured data. Therefore second approach
will leverage creation of scenarios that mimics behavior of the attacker. These
scenarios are described in the Testing chapter. Data is simulated and used in
conjunction with the first approach.
With this test environment this thesis can be validated as well as evalu-
ated the impact in the real-world scenarios. For these scenarios, laboratory
environment is designed (see Figure 1.9).
Figure 1.9: Architecture diagram of the lab environment
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Design
In the analysis chapter threat intelligence and its types were defined. Utiliza-
tion of threat intelligence, meaning making threat intelligence actionable, in-
cludes integrating each stage of threat intelligence cycle together. This chapter
serves for designing every stage of that threat intelligence cycle to solve the
complex problem of utilization threat intelligence (see Figure 1.3). To achieve
that, platforms that play a key role in the cycle have been selected in the
analysis chapter. Use cases are part of the production stage of the threat
intelligence cycle. Therefore they are also designed here in this chapter. Ar-
chitecture and design from this chapter will be then leveraged in the realization
chapter.
2.1 Integration
In order to fulfill requirements and utilize threat intelligence, Threat Intel-
ligence Management Platform and Security Information and Event Manage-
ment must be integrated. This integration is designed in this chapter. Ac-
cording to Gartner, an integration is defined as [47]:
Integration services are detailed design and implementation ser-
vices that link application functionality (custom software or pack-
age software) and/or data with each other or with the established
or planned IT infrastructure.
Threat Intelligence Management Platform suits for data collection and
analysis stage of the cycle whereas SIEM tool serves for the production and
evaluation stage. Requirement stage is outside of any platform. Integration of
those two platforms ties together the threat intelligence cycle (see Figure 1.6).
That means the goal of the integration is to tie stages highlighted in red
(Data collection and Analysis) that are done in the Collective Intelligence
Framework with the stages highlighted in green that are one in the Splunk
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platform (see Figure 1.6). An indicator of successful integration is that threat
intelligence data is being automatically ingested in the Splunk platform and
can be leveraged in the production stage.
2.1.1 Architecture
In order to design good architecture of the integration, goals and require-
ments must be defined. In this case, the goal of the integration is to get
collected, stored, processed, normalized and enriched threat intelligence feeds
into the SIEM tool. Main requirements are automation, scalability, adjustabil-
ity, extensibility, performance and reliability. Automation means that newly
collected threat intelligence feeds are automatically updated and pushed to
the SIEM platform. Scalability means that this design is valid even if the
number of threat feeds or data from various sources will significantly raise in
the future. Adjustability takes into consideration that different organization
may have a different infrastructure where strictly limited architecture may
not be suitable. Adjustability ensures that the architecture can be slightly
adjusted to fulfill needs of the organization. Extensibility takes into consid-
eration that the organization might try to extend platforms by new threat
intelligence cycles or other development on both platforms. That way, it is
ensured that proposed architecture will not be an obstacle or bottleneck that
needs to be redesigned in the future. Performance is important from the pro-
duction perspective. Using best practices defined by the vendors or developers
ensure maximum possible performance. Reliability ensures that for example
in the case of for example network failure, automated integration process will
continue where it stopped without having to manually intervene. To sum up,
requirements for the proposed design are defined as:
• Automated
• Scalable
• Adjustable
• Extensible
• Performance
• Reliable
2.1.2 Proposed Design
Creating a good architecture requires a good knowledge of the both involved
platforms to evaluate possible advantages and disadvantages. Therefore it is
an important to note that proposed design in this thesis have been changed and
altered after the consultations with Splunk engineers and Splunk architects
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on their video-led conferences. Main reasons for that were to not make any
sacrifices on the architecture requirements. It resulted in the following design
(see Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1: Architecture diagram of the proposed design
In the proposed design, two machines with the UNIX operating system
are present. However, this is not a design requirement. Reasons for using two
distinct machines were to better illustrate that these platforms can reside on
different machines or different networks which support adjustability.
The machine on the left (see Figure 2.1) is running Collective Intelligence
Framework (CIF Server) and collect, store and parse data from the threat
intelligence feeds (see Figure 2.2).
On the same machine (see Figure 2.1) runs software development kit for
collective intelligence platform (CIF Client). CIF Client pulls data from the
CIF Server using its API (Application Programming Interface). This allows
having multiple CIF Clients in multiple locations that can pull data from the
same CIF Server. At this point, data is being collected and processed and can
be pulled via API. Splunk platform is running on the second machine. Both
machines reside in the Amazon Web Services cloud (see Figure 2.3) which
requires extra knowledge to configure that is outside of the scope of this thesis.
It is, however, not an architecture requirements and these machines can reside
on any infrastructure.
Next step is to design how data that can be pulled from CIF Server are
going to be sent to Splunk platform in an automated manner. Splunk has
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Figure 2.2: Part of the architecture diagram of the proposed design
Figure 2.3: Part of the architecture diagram of the proposed design
many ways how to ingest data, one of it is listening on the certain port (see
Figure 2.3). Eventually, data could be automatically pulled using script via
API and sent directly to Splunk platform on this port. However, there is a
better way to do this and it is recommended as a best practice from Splunk
vendor itself. This includes a lightweight agent, called Splunk Universal For-
warder that collects the data by monitoring files or folders. This data are
compressed and sent to Splunk platform. In the case of the larger environ-
ment which consists of multiple indexers, it can load-balance the data across
all indexers. It has also the ability to cache, monitor and acknowledge if data
has been correctly received in the case of the network failure.
In order to use Splunk Universal Forwarder, the directory containing pulled
data is created. The script, running as a cronjob every hour is created and it
26
2.2. Usecases
pulls data from CIF Server using API and appends new results to a file (see
Figure 2.4). This file is then being monitored by the universal forwarder and
forwards data to Splunk platform.
Figure 2.4: Part of the architecture diagram of the proposed design
This concludes the proposed design which implementation is described
later in the realization chapter. Final design is shown above (see Figure 2.1).
It fulfills all requirements defined in the architecture subsection.
2.2 Usecases
At this point integration took place and the threat intelligence cycle is fully
tied. That means that the red stages (see Figure 1.6) are inter-connected
with the stages highlighted in green. Therefore selected use cases addressing
problems analyzed in the sections 1.5.1 - 1.5.3 can be designed. These use
cases will define and represent requirements and drive the following stages
–Data collection, analysis and production. These three stages are designed for
every use case.
2.2.1 TOR Traffic
TOR Traffic has been analyzed in the section 1.5.1. In this section, full threat
intelligence cycle with specific use cases that leverage threat intelligence are
designed. Their goals are to enhance the organization capability to detect
TOR traffic, in both outgoing and incoming traffic. Detection allows and
leads to the investigation and elimination of the risk.
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2.2.1.1 Requirements
Leveraging open source threat feeds that collect TOR nodes, such communic-
ation can be detected and alerted.
Two use cases for TOR traffic are designed:
• Alert - Detection of TOR traffic originated in the organization (see Fig-
ure 2.5)
• Alert - Detection of TOR traffic with destination in the organization
(see Figure 2.6)
Figure 2.5: TOR traffic originated in the organization
Figure 2.6: TOR traffic with destination in the organization
For the detection of such traffic, logs from the perimeter firewalls must be
present in the SIEM tool. The onion router is using TCP protocol. There-
fore if the source IP in the network communication is coming from inside the
organization, destination IP is on a list of known TOR entry/exit points that
indicate outgoing traffic. Because outgoing TOR traffic originated in the or-
ganization, an alert should be raised. To allow the security operation center
analyst to investigate this more efficiently, statistics on transferred bytes were
leveraged. A high number of outgoing bytes originated at one source IP inside
the organization to the multiple TOR entry/exit nodes can indicate data ex-
filtration. Incident response team might contact the user or temporarily cut
off the asset from the network before the incident is properly investigated. In
the second case, to detect traffic that destinate to our network, various scen-
arios can happen. It can be legitimate traffic but also an attacker in various
stages of attack according to Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain [3]. It would
be misleading and trigger lots of false positives if an alert is raised for any
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incoming traffic from TOR. However, such behavior should be detected, re-
ported and visualized so the security operation center analyst can investigate
the context of the traffic and do a proper incident response.
2.2.1.2 Data collection
Data are collected from open source threat intelligence feeds. For this use case
feed with TOR nodes is essential. To select the best feeds, some statistical
analysis must be done. These listed questions should be asked for every source:
• How often is selected threat feed updated?
• What is the context behind this feed?
• What is the overlap with other feed?
Fortunately, there is a community portal that is doing regular statistics on
some open source feeds [48]. Five different feeds for TOR nodes can be found.
1. tor_exits by TorProject.org
2. iblocklist_onion_router by iBlocklist.com
3. et_tor by Emerging Threats
4. dm_tor by dan.me.uk
5. bm_tor by torstatus.blutmagie.de
However, importing all feeds would not be a right approach. Before ac-
cepting a new threat intelligence feed, these questions must be answered. The
overlapping table that displays how many percent data of one feed can be
found in another feed has been created (see Figure 2.7).
Figure 2.7: Selected Threat Intelligence Feeds and their percentage overlap
across each other
From the 2.7 it is obvious that four of five feeds have around 90% overlap.
How are we going to determine which feed is the most suitable for our needs?
Another set of statistics helped to understand and compare how these feed
differ (see Figure 2.8).
Feeds 2.- 5. overlap each other in around 90%. That means they share
approximate the same amount of unique TOR nodes (IPs). However, there is
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a significant difference in how often is data in the feed updated and rotated.
In the dm_tor feed data is updated in average every 59 minutes and 92% of all
IPs in the list have been added in the last 30 days. This shows that this feed
is regularly managed and taken care of. This significantly raises confidence of
the data that is in this feed. This is the reason why this feed was selected.
As they overlap in around 90% data with other three feeds, these other feeds
were not used as it is preferred to have quality over quantity.
The second selected feed (highlighted in yellow) is managed by the Tor-
Project.org itself and it does have only 45% overlap with the first selected feed.
In average it is updated every 67 minutes. This indicates good quality of this
feed.
To sum up, the following two threat intelligence feeds were collected for
the purpose of this use case:
1. tor_exits by TorProject.org
2. idm_tor by dan.me.uk
2.2.1.3 Analysis
Selected threat intelligence feeds were collected using Threat Intelligence Plat-
form, namely – Collective Intelligence Framework that has the capability to
collect, store, parse and normalize the threat intelligence feeds and then en-
rich them. Indicators that are extracted from these feeds are IPv4 addresses.
Collective Intelligence Framework allows enablement of custom confidence for
each feed as well as custom tags. For these feeds relatively high confidence
was assigned due to the fact that both feeds are regularly managed and up-
dated. One of those feeds come from the creators of the TorProject itself.
Confidence nine out of ten was therefore assigned for both feeds. This is the
best effort based and can differ based on the user experience. Recommenda-
tion was taken from the Collective Intelligence Framework e-book hosted on
the git-hub wiki [49]. Indicators are sent to Splunk platform where they will
be correlated with data from various sources. IPv4 addresses are enriched
with the geo-location and the name of the provider, that is managing those
autonomous system number.
Proposed time frame before updating indicators in the used platforms is
1 hour to keep performance benefit as well as the benefit of having the most
recent data.
To fulfill use case requirements and correlate data with extracted indic-
ators, data sources that are monitoring network traffic must be ingested into
Splunk platform. This includes mostly all perimeter firewalls. In this thesis,
Palo Alto firewall [50] has been leveraged as a source of network traffic logs.
It is important to note, that the firewall should be configured to monitor start
of the sessions.
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2.2.1.4 Production
In this stage, correlation searches were designed. Natural language is used to
describe the logical flow of the use case, whereas in the realization chapter
technical details are described.
For the first use case, Alert - Detection of TOR traffic originated in the
organization, matching alert rule has two logical conditions that need to be
satisfied for use cases to trigger:
• Source IP belongs to the internal network and this includes data from
all network devices across various vendors
• Destination IP is on the list of extracted indicators
For the second use case, Report - Detection of TOR traffic with the destin-
ation in the organization, matching rule is composed of two logical conditions:
• Source IP is on the list of extracted indicators
• Destination IP belongs to the organizational network
2.2.1.5 Evaluation
Evaluation of the results serves as feedback for further improvements. Pro-
posed testing includes connections from the lab environment to the internet
using TOR browser for outbound and connection attempts to the internal
organizational network using TOR browser for the inbound use case.
2.2.2 Ransomware
Ransomware has been analyzed in the section 1.5.2. In this section, full threat
intelligence cycle with specific use cases that leverage threat intelligence are
designed. Their goals are to enhance the organization capability to detect
ransomware activity during different stages of the attack according to the
Lockheed Martin Cyber Kill Chain (see Figure 1.5).
2.2.2.1 Requirements
There are three vectors that can be observed with most of the ransomware.
This is based on how the selected feed has it defined.
• Distribution of the malicious code
• Command&Control
• Payment
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Most common type of ransomware is delivered through phishing email with
a malicious attachment that exploits some vulnerability [37]. Inserted mali-
cious code then tries to download the ransomware itself from the distribution
sites [38]. Let’s imagine a situation that the phishing email surpassed the
spam and phishing filter and the user opened the malicious attachment which
exploited some local vulnerability, downloaded and ran a malicious code. If
the signature of the malicious code was unknown for the local anti-virus, it is
the first vector where threat intelligence can step in and detect the connection
to or from the distribution site. Therefore it can detect a ransomware delivery
from the distribution site to the target machine.
The second vector is the discovery of communication to the command and
control server. It is common that the ransomware will try to hide its commu-
nication among the regular traffic to avoid detection. Detection avoidance can
be done through TOR network or by using encrypted protocols like HTTPS
to communicate with the remote command and control server [35, 51]. Early
detection in this phase (see Figure 1.5) [3] may lead to quick incident response
and significantly reduce damage. Furthermore, more aggressive ransomware
can not only encrypt the local machine but also attempt to propagate itself
across the network [37]. Command and control servers are used for ransom-
ware to “call home” and report infected machine and exchange encryption
keys. It is not unusual that the attacker is waiting until a reasonable number
of machines inside the organization is infected before delivering encryption
keys to the target machines [37].
The third vector is a payment itself. Scared and feared users might try to
silently pay the ransom. It is necessary for the cyber security team to know
about such behavior to launch an investigation or possibly reduce the dam-
age on other infected machines. Incident response team extracts indicators
of compromise of the certain ransomware to find similar machines that are
infected but the encryption process hasn’t started yet.
To enhance the detection capabilities, network data must be correlated
with the threat intelligence feeds. Ideally, the organization will use and in-
gest data from tools like Proxy or Web Gateway, DNS, Windows AppLocker,
Windows Enhanced Mitigation Experience toolkit or anti-virus. In this thesis,
proxy data have been leveraged.
Three use cases have been selected and implemented (see Figure 2.9):
• Detection of traffic from/to the malicious distribution site
• Detection of traffic from/to the malicious command and control server
• Detection of traffic to the malicious payment site
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Figure 2.9: Illustration of different types of communication between the target
and the attacker according to the threat intelligence feed ransomware.abuse.ch
2.2.2.2 Data collection
Data is collected from open source threat intelligence feeds. For this use case,
feed of distribution sites, command and control servers and malicious payment
site is leveraged. Currently there was only one open-source provider that is
keeping track of ransomware indicators and that is:
• ransomwaretracker.abuse.ch
This ransomware tracker is updated every 5 minutes and it provides indicat-
ors for following “family” of ransomware: TeslaCrypt, CryptoWall, Torrent-
Locker, PadCrypt, Locky, CTB-Locker, FAKBEN, and PayCrypt. Abuse.ch
is in threat intelligence community known as a trustworthy source with a good
reputation with minimum false positives.
2.2.2.3 Analysis
Selected threat intelligence feeds were collected using Threat Intelligence Plat-
form, in this case, Collective Intelligence Framework. Indicators that are ex-
tracted from these feeds are URLs that are further enriched as described in
the analysis chapter in the section 1.6.2. Collective Intelligence Framework
allows us to enable custom confidence for each feed as well as custom tags.
This feed has a high confidence as it is regularly updated and abuse.ch is
an open-source provider that has a good reputation in the threat intelligence
community. This was confirmed and reviewed by the security researchers from
Accenture Security Incident Response team that operates a security operation
center for its clients. Therefore, these indicators have confidence nine out of
ten. They are sent to Splunk platform where they will be correlated with data
from various sources. Proposed time period before updating indicators in the
used platforms is 1 hour to keep performance benefit as well as the benefit
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of having the most recent data. URLs are enriched to fully qualified domain
names with lowered confidence which are further enriched to IPv4 addresses
in case of multiple sub-domains hosted on multiple servers.
In the case of ransomware indicators, there is no limited lifespan. Even
though the command and control server might be already located somewhere
else or being shut down by law enforcement agencies, it would still indicate a
behavior that should be properly investigated to find out why that machine
is contacting a server that was known for malicious activities. There is an
option that the ransomware is just trying to “phone home” from a predefined
or generated list of his command and control servers until an active server
is found. This way, early detection might help us identify infected machines
before the damage is done.
To fulfill use case requirements and correlate data with extracted indicat-
ors, data sources monitoring network traffic and web traffic must have been
ingested into Splunk. This includes all firewalls monitoring network traffic,
Domain Name Server (DNS) data for the domain names indicators and Web
Gateway, Proxy or Endpoint data for the URL indicators. In this thesis, Palo
Alto firewall [50] has been leveraged as a source of network traffic logs and
Squid [52] for proxy logs. In the production environment, it is recommended
to ingest also anti-virus and Windows audit logs to provide the full picture
for the cyber security teams.
2.2.2.4 Production
In this stage, correlation searches were designed. Natural language is used to
describe the logical flow of the use case, whereas in the realization chapter
technical details are described.
First use case, Alert - Detection of traffic from/to the malicious distribution
site, its matching alert rule has two sub-rules and logical condition that needs
to be satisfied for use cases to trigger:
• Source IP belongs to the internal network and this includes data from
all network devices across various vendors AND Destination IP/do-
main/URL is on the indicator list as malicious distribution site
• Destination IP belongs to the internal network and this includes data
from all network devices across various vendors AND Source IP/do-
main/URL is on the indicator list as malicious distribution site
The second and third use case have similar logical flow, but focus on com-
mand and control server or malicious payment site:
Detection of traffic from/to the malicious command and control server :
• Source IP belongs to the internal network and this includes data from
all network devices across various vendors AND Destination IP/do-
main/URL is on the indicator list as command and control server
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• Destination IP belongs to the internal network and this includes data
from all network devices across various vendors AND Source IP/do-
main/URL is on the indicator list as command and control server
Detection of traffic to the malicious payment site:
• Source IP belongs to the internal network and this includes data from
all network devices across various vendors AND Destination IP/do-
main/URL is on the indicator list as malicious payment site
• Destination IP belongs to the internal network and this includes data
from all network devices across various vendors AND Source IP/do-
main/URL is on the indicator list as malicious payment site
This can be, however, matched by one rule and the contextual data about
the type of malicious indicator can be provided in the alert. It depends on the
organizational needs and their preferences and based on their reaction plan
for each scenario.
2.2.2.5 Evaluation
Evaluation of the results serves as feedback for further improvements. Pro-
posed testing includes simulated connections to the known malicious URLs,
domains or IPs that has served for malicious activities, including distribution
site, command and control server and payment sites.
2.2.3 Phishing
Phishing has been analyzed in the section 1.5.3. In this section, full threat
intelligence cycle with specific use cases that leverage threat intelligence are
designed. Their goals are to enhance the organization capability to detect
users accessing sites known for their malicious content.
2.2.3.1 Requirements
To enhance detection capabilities using publicly available threat intelligence
feeds, the use case for accessing phishing sites is implemented:
• Detection of access to sites associated with phishing activities (see Fig-
ure 2.10)
To enhance the detection capabilities, network data must be correlated
with the threat intelligence feeds. Ideally, the organization will use and ingest
data from tools like Proxy or Web Gateway, DNS and Email server.
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Figure 2.10: User in the organizational network accessing site known for ma-
licious or phishing activities
2.2.3.2 Data Collection
By searching for the keyword "phishing feeds" it is possible to see that many
commercial companies are offering phishing threat intelligence feeds that can
be purchased.
It was found that communities like OpenPhish and PhishTank offer phish-
ing feeds that are open for the community usage. OpenPhish launched in
2014 as a result of three years research project on phishing detection. They
are using their algorithms to automatically detect phishing sites as well as
getting reported submission from their partners. Community, academic and
commercial feeds are available. They differ on the amount of enrichment that
is shipped with the indicator. PhishTank is operated by OpenDNS which is
now a Cisco company. People can submit, verify and share phishing data.
Both sources have high reputation in the threat intelligence community.
2.2.3.3 Analysis
The main indicator that is extracted from OpenPhish and PhishTank is URL.
This extracted indicator have the highest confidence, nine out of ten as it
is primary source of phishing. URLs are enriched to fully qualified domain
names with lowered confidence which are further enriched to IPv4 addresses in
case of multiple sub-domains hosted on multiple servers. In certain cases, one
IP address can host multiple websites where only one is abused for phishing
activities. Therefore, the confidence of such indicator is lowered. However,
such activity should be detected and reported.
The lifespan of such indicator is not limited as it is important to detect
attempts to access sites that have been associated with phishing activities
even though the server is already shut down.
Phishing email campaigns can be launched from the same domains that
are then used for hosting malicious code or phishing site.
To fulfill use case requirements and correlate data with extracted indicat-
ors, data sources monitoring network traffic and web traffic must have been
ingested into Splunk. This includes all firewalls monitoring network traffic,
Domain Name Server (DNS) data for the domain names indicators and Web
Gateway, Proxy or Endpoint data for the URL indicators. In this thesis, Palo
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Alto firewall has been leveraged as a source of network traffic logs and Squid
for proxy logs.
2.2.3.4 Production
In this stage, correlation searches were designed. Natural language is used to
describe logical flow of the use case, whereas in the implementation chapter
technical details are described.
First use case, Detection of access to sites associated with phishing activ-
ities, its matching alert rule has a logical condition that needs to be satisfied
for use cases to trigger:
• Alert - Source address belong to the internal organizational network and
destination URL is on the indicator list
• Alert - Source address belong to the internal organizational network and
destination domain is on the indicator list
• Alert - Source address belong to the internal organizational network and
destination IP address is on the indicator list
2.2.3.5 Evaluation
Evaluation of the results serves as feedback for further improvements. Pro-
posed testing includes connections made from the lab environment to the
known malicious URLs their domains and IPs that has served for malicious
and phishing activities.
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Chapter 3
Realization
This chapter describes implementation steps done to fulfill the desired archi-
tecture and requirements defined in the threat intelligence cycle. It includes
installation and configuration steps that are pre-requirements for the integra-
tion.
3.1 Installation
This section describes implementation steps done which are pre-requirements
for the integration of Threat Intelligence Platform (Collective Intelligence
Platform) with Security information and event management tool (Splunk plat-
form). It includes installation and base configuration.
3.1.1 Splunk
Splunk is a multi-platform tool that can be installed on Windows, Unix or
other operating systems. In this thesis Unix machine based on Red Hat En-
terprise Linux on Amazon Web Services have been leveraged. Amazon Web
Services is an infrastructure as a service (IaaS) provider. In this thesis, it
has provided instances sufficient performance that is required by Splunk for a
reasonable price.
As one of the requirements for the thesis is to have a solution that is
ready for production use, the installation script has been created to make it
easier for the reader to install and run Splunk platform. However, this script
serves as proof of concept or for small environments and should be adjusted for
larger environments that ingest more than 10 GB of data per day according to
Splunk Architecture guidance that was presented on their video-conferences.
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3.1.2 Collective Intelligence Framework
Collective Intelligence Framework was installed on the Amazon Web Services
as well. The newest stable release of Collective Intelligence Framework was
downloaded and installed according to the documentation7. In the following
text this platform will be referred as CIF Server
3.1.2.1 Software Development Kit
Collective Intelligence Framework Software Development Kit is shipped and
installed together with the CIF platform. However, it is a separate software
that serves for the communication with the CIF Server. It can be used locally
on the same machine or remotely based on the architecture needs. According
to the proposed design, in this thesis CIF Software Development Kit resides
on the same machine as the CIF Server and it is used to locally pull data
from the CIF Server
3.2 Configuration
This section is describing the configuration that had to be done prior to the in-
tegration process. It includes both Collective Intelligence Platform and Splunk
platform.
3.2.1 Collective Intelligence Framework
The first step in the threat intelligence cycle is data collection. Threat intelli-
gence feeds have been analyzed and designed in the previous chapters. They
are implemented in this chapter.CIF Server is using a rule-based framework
to define parameters to collect selected data feed and to define properties of
the feed such as confidence, tag or parsing method. These rules are written
in YAML Language8.
A couple of default rules are shipped with the CIF and can be used as
a template for building new rules. Important fields that need to be noticed
are parser which describes format of the data feed, tags that describe context
of the data, confidence which informs about trustworthiness of the data and
pattern to define regex to parse data in case of usage of the format that is
structured but not in the known formats as CSV, XML or JSON.
These configuration files have been reviewed and written to collect selec-
ted data feeds. In this thesis, only selected fields have been listed and full
configuration can be found on the attached CD.
Dan.me.uk:
7https://github.com/csirtgadgets/bearded-avenger-deploymentkit/wiki
8YAML stands for YAML Ain’t Markup Language
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provider: dan.me.uk
tags:
- tor
parser: pattern
remote: https://www.dan.me.uk/torlist/
confidence: 9
pattern: ^(\S+)$
values:
- indicator
Torproject.org:
provider: torproject.org
confidence: 9
tags:
- tor
parser: pattern
values:
- indicator
- reporttime
remote: https://check.torproject.org/exit-addresses
pattern: ExitAddress (\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3})
([^\r\n]*)
Ransomware.abuse.ch:
parser: csv
provider: ransomware.abuse.ch
confidence: 9
tags: ransomware
values:
- reporttime
- threat
- description
- null
- indicator
remote: http://ransomwaretracker.abuse.ch/feeds/csv
Openphish.com:
tags: phish
provider: openphish.com
confidence: 9
values: indicator
itype: url
pattern: ^(.+)$
remote: https://openphish.com/feed.txt
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Phishtank.com:
parser: json
remote: http://data.phishtank.com/data/online-valid.json
defaults:
provider: phishtank.com
application:
- http
- https
confidence: 9
tags: phishing
feeds:
urls:
itype: url
map:
- submission_time
- url
- target
- phish_detail_url
- details
values:
- lasttime
- indicator
- description
- altid
- additional_data
3.2.2 Splunk
Splunk environment needs to be configured in order to receive, index and pro-
cess incoming data correctly. This configuration includes index creation and
inputs definition. Splunk is using a modular structure to define configurations
on different layers. Splunk App is a hierarchical structure of configuration
files that allow developers to create a re-usable app with all it is necessary
configurations.
In this thesis, such app will be created to utilize threat intelligence. Splunk
defines an app directory structure that needs to be followed (see Figure 3.1).
The reader can find more information about Splunk app architecture in the
developer portal9. Default folder serves for the configurations that are app
specific and will be overwritten in the next upgrade. Local folder serves for
local changes that have higher priority in case of conflict with the default folder
but configuration changes will not get overwritten if the app is upgraded. The
reader can find more information about configuration precedence in Splunk
on the following documentation page [53].
9http://dev.splunk.com/view/dev-guide/SP-CAAAE29
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Two configuration files have been created, inputs.conf and indexes.conf to
setup input and index configuration needed for proper data ingestion.
Splunk index is like a jar where data with similar certain characteristics
are put. Advanced settings can be then applied to the index like data re-
tention, data rotation or specific searches limited to certain technology, i.e
Windows logs. Index can be defined in the following way in the indexes.conf
configuration file:
[threatintel]
coldPath = $SPLUNK_DB/threatintel/colddb
enableDataIntegrityControl = 0
enableTsidxReduction = 0
homePath = $SPLUNK_DB/threatintel/db
maxTotalDataSizeMB = 512000
thawedPath = $SPLUNK_DB/threatintel/thaweddb
Inputs are defining a way how Splunk expect to ingest the data. It involves
listening on the certain port, scripted inputs or reading a certain directory.
According to the proposed design, input for receiving Splunk communication
on port 9999 have been created:
[splunktcp://9999]
connection_host = ip
disabled = 1
More information about configuration options are available for the reader
in the Splunk .spec files 10 11
It is important to note that this is the result of attending more than
60 hours of video conferences led by Splunk instructor to fully understand
concepts and configurations that are necessary to administer, architect the
environment and develop new apps.
3.3 Integration
Installation and Configuration section were pre-requirements for the integra-
tion of those two platforms. At this point, data are being collected from the
selected threat intelligence feeds, normalized to the common format and en-
riched. Splunk platform is configured and ready to receive this data. The goal
of the integration is to implement the proposed design (see Figure 2.1).
Implementation steps for the integration are:
1. Setting up a CIF server and CIF router as a daemon service
10indexes.conf - http://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/6.5.3/Admin/Indexesconf
11inputs.conf - http://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/6.5.3/Admin/Inputsconf
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2. Install and configure Splunk Universal Forwarder on the CIF Client
machine
3. Setting up a CIF Client script that pulls data from the CIF Server
4. Validate data is being ingested in Splunk
3.3.1 Setting up a CIF server and CIF router as a daemon
service
Even thought CIF Server is shipped with the Ansible playbook that can setup
a service on the Ubuntu 16 and higher, it was necessary to understand how
this service works and adjust it to the needs of this thesis. To run the service
in the debug mode, -d parameter must be added to the service definition that
is in Ubuntu 16 by default in the /etc/systemd/system/csirtg-smrt.service
For CIF router, in /etc/cif.env a number of threads for the hunter is
selected. Hunter is the module that is responsible for the enrichment of the
threat intelligence feeds. In this thesis, based on the discussion with the owner
and main developer of the Collective Intelligence Platform, 6 threads for the
hunters have been selected. Hardware that has been used in this thesis is AWS
m4.xlarge instance 12
3.3.2 Install and configure Splunk Universal Forwarder
Splunk Universal Forwarder is a light-weight version of the Splunk Enterprise
that has the capability to collect data from files and directories and reliably
forward them to the Splunk platform. It handles network failures with queuing
and for the large-scale environment can load-balance forwarded data across
multiple indexers. This is crucial for the performance in the large-scale pro-
duction environment as if data are distributed across multiple indexers, Splunk
map and reduce search model can run its search and correlation searches in
parallel [54]. To install Splunk Universal Forwarder, an installation script has
been created and it is included on the attached CD.
To monitor folders where the threat intelligence data are extracted ac-
cording to the architecture diagram, an app for inputs and outputs is created.
This could be done in the single app, however, it is a best practice and recom-
mendation from the Splunk engineers to create small reusable modules (apps)
where each module has it is specific purpose and goal.
Inputs.conf have been configured following this template:
[monitor:///<<directory>>]
sourcetype = _json
index = threatintel
disabled = false
12https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/instance-types/
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Monitor stanza defines a folder or file that is monitored. For every folder
or file, a separate stanza is created. This is not always true, as wildcards
can be used but for simplicity, they haven’t been used in this thesis. Index
defines to which “jar” is data sent. For this thesis, an index threatintel have
been created and is used to store threat intelligence data._json is one of the
pre-trained sourcetype that Splunk can parse and it expresses the type of data
for that specific stanza.
Outputs.conf have been configured as following:
[tcpout]
defaultGroup = primary_indexers
[tcpout:primary_indexers]
server = 52.37.0.230:9999
[tcpout-server://52.37.0.230:9999]
In outputs.conf a destination for the Universal Forwarder is configured.
In this thesis, only one indexer is used, however in larger environments this
consist of several indexers where the data are load-balanced across them to
increase search performance.
3.3.3 CIF Client script
In order to achieve this design step (see Figure 2.4), a simple script auto-
matically and regularly pulls data from the CIF Server and saves them into
the file. This script is leveraging the CIF Software Development Kit and ex-
tract data from the internal CIF Server storage. This script is put into the
/etc/cron.hourly/ directory that launches the script every hour.
Script named extract have been created and here partially illustrate the
logic of the script, with «provider» as different provider, «tags» as various
tags and «output_file» as output file:
#!/bin/bash
cif --config /home/cif/.cif.yml --provider <<provider>> --tags
<<tag>> --last-hour --format json >> <<output_file>>
This script used CIF Software Development Kit to access and extract data
from the last hour, from selected providers in the JSON format and append
them to the selected files. Splunk is already monitoring these directories and
in a case of new data is appended, it will be recognized and automatically
send them to Splunk platform.
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3.3.4 Validate data is being ingested in Splunk
To validate that data are being received in the Splunk platform, a command
that search data across the selected index is issued13. Data are being ingested
as the number of received events in this index is over 30 000.
3.4 Usecase development
This section describes methods, techniques and steps that have been leveraged
in order to implement the use cases that have been previously designed.
3.4.1 Search Processing Language
Search Processing Language or it is abbreviated form, SPL is a language that
is used in the Splunk platform to search, filter and transform data across the
indexes filled with various data sources. In this thesis, this language is also
used to define correlation searches and all its sub searches that are required.
Splunk defines SPL as:
SPL encompasses all the search commands and their functions,
arguments, and clauses. Its syntax was originally based on the
Unix pipeline and SQL. The scope of SPL includes data searching,
filtering, modification, manipulation, insertion, and deletion.
Search processing language (SPL) is powerful and allows to write efficient
correlation searches. In order to meet requirements for the scalability, ad-
vanced search techniques in the SPL language needs to be used to perform
efficiently in large-scale environments. Even though such environment is not
leveraged in this thesis, these techniques have been learned from Splunk doc-
umentation and Splunk video-led conferences. More than 50 hours of video
conferences have been spent to deeply understand the language and how to
use and leverage these advanced techniques. These searches are in this thesis
compared with the more basic techniques to prove the concept and usefulness
of using such advanced searches.
As this processing language is very complex, the reader can find more
information and documentation with examples on the Splunk docs 14.
3.4.2 Datamodels
Splunk concept of data models is very important in this thesis. It enables
efficient correlation among various data sources. Let’s first note how Splunk
defines datamodels 15:
13index=threatintel is typed into the search bar and searched all-time
14https://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/6.5.3/Search/Aboutthesearchlanguage
15http://docs.splunk.com/Documentation/Splunk/6.5.3/Knowledge/Aboutdatamodels
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A hierarchically structured, search-time mapping of semantic know-
ledge about one or more datasets that encode the domain knowledge
necessary to generate specialized searches of those datasets.
As data models are used in Splunk for more reasons, this definition might
be confusing for the reader to understand it in the context of this thesis.
Let’s use an example to explain the role of the data models in this thesis. In
the case of network firewalls, multiple vendors exist. As there is no standard-
ized model for the log fields, each vendor uses its own vocabulary for logging.
For example, one vendor use dst_port to inform about the destination port
used in the network communication whereas some other vendor calls it dport.
It is obvious that the information value is the same even if the field names
are different. Data models are trying to bring a standardized abstract model
that if being used, normalize these fields and map them to one common field
name.
This allows to search for the common field name, for example, dest_port
across all data sources that are logging such information. Correlation searches
using SPL that leverage data models are then more efficient, perform better
and are syntactically shorter as only one search is needed to search across all
data sources. Correlation searches that leverage this feature are then vendor
independent and reusable in multiple environments.
3.4.2.1 Accelerated Datamodel
Data model acceleration is a tool that can significantly speed up and increase
performance when searching through large-datasets [55]. This is achieved
using high-performance analytics store [55]. Because requirements for this
thesis requires scalability and performance even for large environments, data
models are accelerated. This is done via Graphical User Interface. It is,
however, optional step and because it requires additional storage for the .tsidx
files, it can be skipped. In this thesis accelerated data models have been used
and they have sped up the search performance more than 10 times as detailed
later.
3.4.2.2 Technical Addon
However, to use and map logs to the Splunk common information model,
configurations – in Splunk terminology called Technical Addons needs to be
written for every data source to map vendor custom fields to the Splunk Com-
mon Information Model. One of the great advantages of Splunk platform is
the ability to download these technical addons from their community portal
where vendors and developers are motivated to share technical add-ons for
their device so it is not necessary to “reinvent the wheel” 16. In this thesis,
16https://splunkbase.splunk.com/
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technical addons that parse, extract and map logs from Palo Alto firewall and
Squid proxy have been leveraged. Documentation of how to install technical
add-on is available for the reader on Splunk docs for every technical addon
through the Splunkbase.
3.4.3 Data correlation
Data correlation is essential for the selected use cases. In this section is de-
scribed how the correlation between threat intelligence indicators and all the
other data sources in the environment is implemented.
In the dictionary, the definition of correlation is:
mutual relation of two or more things, parts, etc.
In our case, it is a relation between data present in the environment and
the indicators gained from the threat intelligence feeds. Correlation is defined
in the use cases which describes where the mutual relation between these
elements (data in the environment and the indicators gained from the threat
intelligence feeds) happen. These correlations are then transformed into the
Search Processing Language to leverage the platform to quickly perform and
correlate data.
Search Processing Language offers many tools that allow to perform and
transform these use cases into the Splunk platform. However, as in every
language, some methods are more or less effective and therefore affect the
resulting performance. It is very important that the implementation steps
were optimized to maximize its performance not only in small but also large-
scale production environments. To efficiently utilize threat intelligence, all
data must be correlated near real-time.
3.4.3.1 Subsearch
One possible implementation was by leveraging Splunk sub-search capability.
Sub-search takes the result from one search and uses the results in another
search. This can be used to correlate events across different data sources
that have at least one common field which in this case would be indicator of
compromise.
Even though this solution would work perfectly in small environments,
there is a significant drawback. Splunk by default limits sub searches to max-
imum 10 thousand events and the maximum runtime of 60 seconds [56]. In
large environments, the results might be incomplete which is not acceptable
from the security point of view. It is possible to increase these default values,
however, that is not recommended approach because sub searches can’t run
in parallel in the case of distributed environment which negatively affect the
overall performance.
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3.4.3.2 Lookup tables
The approach that has been selected in this thesis is by using scheduled
searches to generate lookup tables that are further used to correlate against
the large set of traffic data. Lookup table is a regular CSV file containing
exported fields. This approach would bring significantly better performance
in the large distributed environments with a multiple number of indexers as
it allows to run in parallel.
This has been confirmed by Splunk Professional Services during their video
conferences.
For every combination of use case and type of indicator, lookup generat-
ing search will be used. That means if 3 use cases have been selected – TOR,
Ransomware, Phishing and 3 types of indicators – IPv4, FQDN, URL, 9 dif-
ferent lookup generation searches are done for every combination. However,
threat intelligence data for the TOR use case only cover IPv4 addresses and
can’t be further enriched therefore two combinations are subtracted. All seven
lookup generating scheduled searches are defined in the savedsearches.conf but
for simplicity, only the search part of the stanza is shown here.
Below is a simplified example of the lookup generating searches for the
Phishing use cases. It doesn’t contain other parameters like cron_schedule,
schedule_window or search_mode. Similar searches are generated for TOR
and Ransomware use case.
[URL - Phishing - Lookup generating command enriched with IP]
search = index=threatintel tags=phish* itype=url\
| table indicator,confidence,rdata,provider,tags, description, cc,
asn_desc | outputlookup createinapp=true malicious_url_phish.csv
[FQDN - Phishing - Lookup generating command with enriched FQDN]
search = index=threatintel tags=phish* itype=fqdn\
| table indicator,confidence,rdata,provider,tags, cc, asn_desc,
description | outputlookup createinapp=true
malicious_fqdn_phish.csv
[IPv4 - Phishing - Lookup generating command for IPv4]
search = index=threatintel tags=phish* itype=url rdata!="0.0.0.0" |
rename rdata as "ip_indicator", indicator as "url_rdata" | table
ip_indicator, confidence, url_rdata, provider,tags, description |
rename ip_indicator as "indicator", url_rdata as "rdata" | eval
confidence=(confidence-3) | outputlookup createinapp=true
malicious_ipv4_phish.csv
This piece of configuration stanza is located in the savedsearches.conf and
it generates every hour an updated lookup table where it filters threat intelli-
gence data with tags equal phish*, where * serves as wildcard, filters enriched
data with invalid IP address, filter type of indicator and in the case of en-
riched IP address lowers the confidence as the IP address that host site where
phishing activities have been reported can be shared and used by sites that
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are legitimate.
With the same logic and adjusted search, four more lookup tables are
created every hour. Their configuration files are available in the attached CD.
• URL - Ransomware - Lookup generating command
• FQDN - Ransomware - Lookup generating command with enriched FQDN
• IPv4 - Ransomware - Lookup generating command for IPv4
• IPv4 - TOR - Lookup generating command
3.4.3.3 Correlated datamodels
At this point of the thesis, platforms are integrated, data are properly ingested
from the Collective Intelligence Platform to Splunk platform, lookup tables are
being generated and use cases are defined.
The last step before implementing the defined use case is to select Splunk
data models that are going to be used in the use cases. Data sources that are
required have been already defined and designed in the Analysis and Design
chapter. This is important in order to create correlation searches that are re-
usable as they are implemented according to the Splunk Common Information
Model. Therefore, data model Network Traffic will be used for use cases
working with IPv4 addresses as indicators – TOR and enriched IPv4 indicators
for Ransomware and Phishing use case. Logs containing communication in the
network are being put to this data model. For use cases that use FQDN and
URL as indicators, Web data model will be leveraged as it logs this information
that can be correlated with the FQDN or URL indicators. Fully qualified
domain names and URLs are used in the Ransomware and Phishing use case.
Furthermore, because these data models can contain hundred of thousands
of events per certain period of time from various logging devices, suitably
advanced search technique must be used to increase the performance to the
level that enables almost real-time correlation with the threat intelligence
data on a reasonable hardware. To illustrate this performance difference,
three different scenarios have been tested and measured. This is an important
step as it takes most of the search time in the correlation searches that are
implemented later on. Without a proper performance, utilization of the threat
intelligence data would not be possible as it would not be possible to correlate
this data in reasonable time.
To measure the performance of the search, a unit Events per second is
defined as the number of scanned events divided by the time of the search.
Measurement is done using Search job inspector, which is a feature that dis-
plays detailed information about the processed search job.
It is important to note that the following three scenarios have the same
output (see Figure 3.2). The output is defined as:
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• List and summarize all communication (src_ip <-> dst_ip) in the net-
work
Three types of searches that have been tested and measured are:
• Data model search and statistics
• Advanced data model search and statistics
• Advanced accelerated data model search and statistics
For the Datamodel search and statistics following search have been used:
| datamodel Network_Traffic All_Traffic search | stats
sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as "Bytes in",
sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as "Bytes
out",values(All_Traffic.action) as "Action taken", count as
"Number of connections" ,values(sourcetype) as "Datasource type"
by All_Traffic.src_ip,All_Traffic.dest_ip | sort - "Bytes out"
Results of the search are the following (see Figure 3.3).
The search has returned 3,276 results, scanned 74.951 events in 5.017
seconds. Using defined event per second unit, the basic data model search
has performed approximately 14939 events per second
For the Advanced datamodel search and statistics, different search tech-
nique have been used. This technique is leveraging tstats command, which
leverage deep knowledge how Splunk platform works internally. Following
search have been used:
| tstats sum(All_Traffic.bytes_in) as "Bytes in",
sum(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as "Bytes
out",values(All_Traffic.action) as "Action taken", count as
"Number of connections" ,values(sourcetype) as "Datasource type"
from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by
All_Traffic.src_ip,All_Traffic.dest_ip | sort -"Bytes out"
Results of the search are the following (see Figure 3.4).
The search has returned 3,277 results, scanned 74.967 events in 2.727
seconds. Using defined event per second unit, the basic data model search
has performed approximately 27490 events per second. This is a significant
increase in the performance.
The last type of search is using the same search technique, however, ac-
celerated data models have been created. It takes a couple of hours to create
these accelerated data models but it is definitely worth it as the results have
shown. Accelerated data models are only and only possible to leverage using
the advanced search technique like in the Advanced data model search and
statistics case.
Results of the search are the following (see Figure 3.5).
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Figure 3.3: Performance of the basic datamodel search and statistics
Figure 3.4: Performance of the Advanced datamodel search and statistics
Figure 3.5: Performance of the Advanced accelerated datamodel search and
statistics
The search has returned 3,277 results, scanned 74.998 events in 0.364
seconds. Using defined event per second unit, the basic data model search
has performed approximately 206038 events per second.
To sum up, all three types of searches have resulted almost the same num-
ber of results (the first one has returned one less because in the meantime one
new connection has happened in the network). They have searched a different
number of events as event number is increasing with the time. However, res-
ults have been normalized to one common unit, processed events per second.
The result is summarized as:
• Data model search and statistics - 14939 events per second
• Advanced data model search and statistics - 27490 events per second
• Advanced accelerated data model search and statistics - 206038 events
per second
The difference between the best and the worst type and technique is more
than 13 times difference in processing power. This has significant consequences
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on the cost and performance. By using the best method, hardware perform-
ance can be reduced to get the same performance and therefore reduce the
cost of the infrastructure or to simply have much better performance for the
same cost if the hardware infrastructure is static. Therefore, all use cases will
use the best type of search illustrated in this subsubsection.
3.4.4 Correlation search
In this subsection, implementation of the use cases that have been defined in
the Analysis and Design chapters is done in the Splunk platform. At this point,
a production stage of the threat intelligence cycle (see Figure 1.3) [1] is done.
To achieve this point, Collective Intelligence Platform and Splunk platform
have been selected, installed and configured. These two platforms have been
then integrated. The most difficult part of achieving that was to have sufficient
knowledge of Splunk platform to be able to properly analyze, design and realize
these stages. As it was shown in the previous subsubsection, two searches that
produce same result are far from being equally good. Correlation algorithms,
also known as correlation searches have been implemented in a way that they
are as efficient as they can be, scalable, perform as well as they can and
in their simplest form. This allows not only to easier understand them but
also to modify them or create a new correlation searches according to the
organizational needs and use them as a template. This is a result of extensive
research during video conferences and video training led by Splunk engineers
and documentation reading.
3.4.4.1 TOR
In the Design chapter, two sub-use cases have been defined and designed:
• Alert - Detection of TOR traffic originated in the organization
• Alert - Detection of TOR traffic with destination in the organization
Goal of this correlation search is to alert if any inbound or outbound connec-
tion to the TOR network is detected (see Figure 2.5, 2.6).
Final correlation algorithms (searches) have the following form:
[TOR - Traffic coming from the organization]
| tstats sum(All_Traffic.bytes) as "Bytes",values(All_Traffic.action)
as "Action taken", count,values(sourcetype) as "Datasource type"
from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by
All_Traffic.src_ip,All_Traffic.dest_ip,\
| lookup malicious_ipv4_tor.csv indicator as All_Traffic.dest_ip
OUTPUTNEW indicator,confidence,tags,provider,Country, cc,
asn_desc \
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| where confidence>0 | eval Bytes=round(Bytes/1024/1024,2) | rename
Bytes as "MegaBytes Transferred", All_Traffic.dest_ip as
"Destination IP", All_Traffic.src_ip as "Source IP", count as
"Number of connections", asn_desc as "ASN Description", cc as
"Country Code", confidence as "Confidence"
[TOR - Traffic coming to the organization]
| tstats sum(All_Traffic.bytes) as "Bytes",values(All_Traffic.action)
as "Action taken", count,values(sourcetype) as "Datasource type"
from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by
All_Traffic.src_ip,All_Traffic.dest_ip,\
| lookup malicious_ipv4_tor.csv indicator as All_Traffic.src_ip
OUTPUTNEW indicator,confidence,tags,provider,Country, cc,
asn_desc \
| where confidence>0 | eval Bytes=round(Bytes/1024/1024,2) | rename
Bytes as "MegaBytes Transferred", All_Traffic.dest_ip as
"Destination IP", All_Traffic.src_ip as "Source IP", count as
"Number of connections", asn_desc as "ASN Description", cc as
"Country Code", confidence as "Confidence"
These correlation searches return assets that have been communicating
with the TOR network (inbound and outbound separately) and includes metadata
as action taken by the device that has logged such communication, bytes
transferred, confidence, Country of the indicator, a description based on the
autonomous system number. This allows the person that investigate the in-
cident to better understand the context of the alert to conduct further invest-
igation.
To put this correlation searches into a detection mechanism, an alert search
is created in the savedsearches.conf :
[TOR - Traffic coming from the organization]
action.email.useNSSubject = 1
alert.digest_mode = False
alert.suppress = 1
alert.suppress.fields = All_Traffic.src_ip
alert.suppress.period = 10m
alert.track = 1
auto_summarize.dispatch.earliest_time = -1d@h
counttype = number of events
cron_schedule = */10 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -10m@m
display.general.type = statistics
display.page.search.mode = verbose
display.page.search.tab = statistics
display.visualizations.show = 0
display.visualizations.type = mapping
enableSched = 1
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quantity = 0
relation = greater than
request.ui_dispatch_app = search
request.ui_dispatch_view = search
search = | tstats sum(All_Traffic.bytes) as
"Bytes",values(All_Traffic.action) as "Action taken",
count,values(sourcetype) as "Datasource type" from
datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by
All_Traffic.src_ip,All_Traffic.dest_ip,\
| lookup malicious_ipv4_tor.csv indicator as All_Traffic.dest_ip
OUTPUTNEW indicator,confidence,tags,provider,Country, cc,
asn_desc \
| where confidence>0 | eval Bytes=round(Bytes/1024/1024,2) | rename
Bytes as "MegaBytes Transferred", All_Traffic.dest_ip as
"Destination IP", All_Traffic.src_ip as "Source IP", count as
"Number of connections", asn_desc as "ASN Description", cc as
"Country Code", confidence as "Confidence"
[TOR - Traffic coming to the organization]
action.email.useNSSubject = 1
alert.digest_mode = False
alert.suppress = 0
alert.track = 1
auto_summarize.dispatch.earliest_time = -1d@h
counttype = number of events
cron_schedule = */10 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -15m@m
display.general.type = statistics
display.page.search.mode = verbose
display.page.search.tab = statistics
enableSched = 1
quantity = 0
relation = greater than
request.ui_dispatch_app = ThreatIntel
request.ui_dispatch_view = search
search = | tstats sum(All_Traffic.bytes) as
"Bytes",values(All_Traffic.action) as "Action taken",
count,values(sourcetype) as "Datasource type" from
datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by
All_Traffic.src_ip,All_Traffic.dest_ip,\
| lookup malicious_ipv4_tor.csv indicator as All_Traffic.src_ip
OUTPUTNEW indicator,confidence,tags,provider,Country, cc,
asn_desc \
| where confidence>0 | eval Bytes=round(Bytes/1024/1024,2) | rename
Bytes as "MegaBytes Transferred", All_Traffic.dest_ip as
"Destination IP", All_Traffic.src_ip as "Source IP", count as
"Number of connections", asn_desc as "ASN Description", cc as
"Country Code", confidence as "Confidence"
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These alert searches include cron schedule to run every 10 minutes in a
last 15-minute time window. This is ensured with dispatch.earliest_time set
to -15m@m. This is due to the fact that Splunk platform internally might
delay the search job in case resources are needed for another job. This may
cause running the search later and in order to not lose visibility, broader time
is used. To avoid overwhelming number of alerts, alerts throttling is set up.
It is defined in the TOR traffic from the organization as:
alert.suppress.fields = All_Traffic.src_ip
alert.suppress.period = 10m
alert.track = 1
This ensures that if certain computer connects to the TOR network, alert
with the same source IP will be raised only once. This setting was not applied
for the inbound TOR traffic as if the potential attacker is trying to scan
our network via TOR, it might use the same source IP and it is important
to know it. On the other hand, if the destination IP is the same and the
sources are different, it might indicate a coordinated botnet attack coming via
TOR. Therefore no throttling was applied on the inbound TOR traffic and it
was applied only on outbound traffic. Results of this correlation search are
described in the Testing chapter.
3.4.4.2 Ransomware
In the Design chapter, three use cases have been defined and designed:
• Detection of traffic from/to the malicious distribution site
• Detection of traffic from/to the malicious command and control server
• Detection of traffic to the malicious payment site
Goal of this correlation search is to alert if any connection to the site associated
with ransomware activities is detected (see Figure 2.9). In the configuration
file, «type» is either distribution site, payment site or command and control
server.
Final correlation algorithms (searches) have the following form:
[Ransomware - <<type>> - communication detected to malicious site]
| tstats count, sum(Web.bytes), values(Web.http_content_type),
values(Web.http_method) from datamodel=Web.Web where
(Web.http_method=GET OR Web.http_method=POST) by Web.dest, Web.src
| lookup malicious_url_ransom.csv indicator as Web.dest OUTPUTNEW
indicator,confidence,tags,provider, cc, asn_desc, description,
rdata,
| search confidence=* AND description="<<type>>"
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[Ransomware - <<type>> - communication detected to enriched IPv4
address ]
| tstats count,values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as "Destination Ports" ,
sum(All_Traffic.bytes) as "Transferred Bytes" from
datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by
All_Traffic.src_ip,All_Traffic.dest_ip
| lookup malicious_ipv4_ransom.csv indicator as All_Traffic.dest_ip
OUTPUTNEW indicator,confidence,tags,provider,rdata, description
| search confidence=* AND description="<<type>>"
First correlation searches return assets that have accessed URL that is
on the malicious list and includes metadata as methods, content type and
the amount of data transferred. This allows the person that investigate the
incident to better understand the context of the alert to conduct further in-
vestigation.
Second correlation search returns assets that have been communicating
with the IP address that was enriched from the URL indicators. This search
has lowered confidence as the IP address can be legitimate and it is abused
for redirections to phishing sites.
To put this correlation searches into a detection mechanism, an alert search
is created in the savedsearches.conf :
[Ransomware - <<type>> - communication detected to malicious site]
action.email.useNSSubject = 1
alert.digest_mode = 0
alert.severity = 5
alert.suppress = 0
alert.track = 1
auto_summarize.dispatch.earliest_time = -1d@h
counttype = number of events
cron_schedule = */10 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -15m@m
enableSched = 1
quantity = 0
relation = greater than
request.ui_dispatch_app = ThreatIntel
request.ui_dispatch_view = search
search = | tstats count, sum(Web.bytes),
values(Web.http_content_type), values(Web.http_method) from
datamodel=Web.Web where (Web.http_method=GET OR
Web.http_method=POST) by Web.dest, Web.src\
| lookup malicious_url_ransom.csv indicator as Web.dest OUTPUTNEW
indicator,confidence,tags,provider, cc, asn_desc, description,
rdata, \
| search confidence=* AND description="<<type>>"
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[Ransomware - <<type>> - communication detected to enriched IPv4
address]
action.email.useNSSubject = 1
alert.digest_mode = 0
alert.suppress = 0
alert.track = 1
auto_summarize.dispatch.earliest_time = -1d@h
counttype = number of events
cron_schedule = */10 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -15m@m
enableSched = 1
quantity = 0
relation = greater than
request.ui_dispatch_app = ThreatIntel
request.ui_dispatch_view = search
search = | tstats count,values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as "Destination
Ports" , sum(All_Traffic.bytes) as "Transferred Bytes" from
datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by
All_Traffic.src_ip,All_Traffic.dest_ip\
| lookup malicious_ipv4_ransom.csv indicator as All_Traffic.dest_ip
OUTPUTNEW indicator,confidence,tags,provider,rdata, description \
| search confidence=* AND description="<<type>>"
These alert searches include cron schedule to run every 10 minutes in a
last 15-minute time window. This is ensured with dispatch.earliest_time set
to -15m@m. This is due to the fact that Splunk platform internally might
delay the search job in case resources are needed for another job. This may
cause running the search later and in order to not lose visibility, broader time
is used.
Alert throttling was not set as it is important to alert about every distinct
connection to the site with phishing or malicious content. Results of this
correlation search are described in the Testing chapter.
3.4.4.3 Phishing
In the Design chapter, one use case has been defined and designed:
• Detection of access to sites associated with phishing activities (see Fig-
ure 2.10)
The goal of this correlation search is to alert if any connection to the site
associated with phishing or malicious activities is detected (see Figure 2.10).
Final correlation algorithms (searches) have the following form:
[Phishing - User has accessed phishing site]
| tstats count, sum(Web.bytes), values(Web.http_content_type),
values(Web.http_method) from datamodel=Web.Web where
(Web.http_method=GET OR Web.http_method=POST) by Web.dest, Web.src
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| lookup malicious_url_phish.csv indicator as Web.dest OUTPUTNEW
indicator,confidence,tags,provider, cc, asn_desc, description,
rdata,
| where confidence>0
[Phishing - User has accessed IP address that is hosting phishing URL
]
| tstats count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as "Destination Ports"
from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by
All_Traffic.src_ip,All_Traffic.dest_ip,
| lookup malicious_ipv4_phish.csv indicator as All_Traffic.dest_ip
OUTPUTNEW indicator,confidence,tags,provider rdata
| where confidence>0 | rename rdata as "Malicious URL associated with
this IP"
Correlation searches return assets that have accessed URL that is on the
malicious list and includes metadata as methods, content type and the amount
of data transferred. This allows the person that investigate the incident to
better understand the context of the alert to conduct further investigation.
The second type of correlation searches return assets that have been commu-
nicating with the IP address that was enriched from the URL indicators. This
search has lowered confidence as the IP address can be legitimate and it is
abused for redirections to phishing sites.
To put this correlation searches into a detection mechanism, an alert search
is created in the savedsearches.conf :
[Phishing - User has accessed phishing site]
action.email.useNSSubject = 1
alert.digest_mode = False
alert.suppress = 0
alert.track = 1
auto_summarize.dispatch.earliest_time = -1d@h
counttype = number of events
cron_schedule = */10 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -15m@m
display.general.type = statistics
display.page.search.mode = verbose
display.page.search.tab = statistics
enableSched = 1
quantity = 0
relation = greater than
request.ui_dispatch_app = ThreatIntel
request.ui_dispatch_view = search
search = | tstats count, sum(Web.bytes),
values(Web.http_content_type), values(Web.http_method) from
datamodel=Web.Web where (Web.http_method=GET OR
Web.http_method=POST) by Web.dest, Web.src\
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| lookup malicious_url_phish.csv indicator as Web.dest OUTPUTNEW
indicator,confidence,tags,provider, cc, asn_desc, description,
rdata, \
| where confidence>0
[Phishing - User has accessed IP address that is hosting phishing URL]
action.email.useNSSubject = 1
alert.digest_mode = False
alert.severity = 2
alert.suppress = 0
alert.track = 1
auto_summarize.dispatch.earliest_time = -1d@h
counttype = number of events
cron_schedule = */10 * * * *
dispatch.earliest_time = -15m@m
display.general.type = statistics
display.page.search.mode = verbose
display.page.search.tab = statistics
enableSched = 1
quantity = 0
relation = greater than
request.ui_dispatch_app = search
request.ui_dispatch_view = search
search = | tstats count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as
"Destination Ports" from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic by
All_Traffic.src_ip,All_Traffic.dest_ip,\
| lookup malicious_ipv4_phish.csv indicator as All_Traffic.dest_ip
OUTPUTNEW indicator,confidence,tags,provider rdata\
| where confidence>0 | rename rdata as "Malicious URL associated with
this IP"
These alert searches include cron schedule to run every 10 minutes in a
last 15-minute time window. This is ensured with dispatch.earliest_time set
to -15m@m. This is due to the fact that Splunk platform internally might
delay the search job in case resources are needed for another job. This may
cause running the search later and in order to not lose visibility, broader time
is used. Alert throttling was not set as it is important to alert about every
distinct connection to the site with phishing or malicious content. Results of
this correlation search are described in the Testing chapter.
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Testing
Testing chapter evaluates the design and realization done in the previous
chapters. As mentioned in the analysis chapter, two distinct approaches have
been used to evaluate proof of concept and the realization.
Correlation algorithms have been tested on large production data samples
of the organization that operates in finance. They have found assets in the or-
ganization that had been communicating with the TOR network and couple of
phishing accesses have been detected. These were critical events that must be
further investigated. This has confirmed that the solution from this thesis can
be used in real production environment. Unfortunately, due to the complexity
of the organization, up to this date no further approval have been received
and therefore these results can’t be further detailed in this thesis.
The second testing approach consisted of creating a lab environment where
such behavior can be simulated and tested. This testing environment was cre-
ated in Amazon Web Services cloud infrastructure. This included Windows
and Unix servers, Palo Alto Next Generation Firewall, Squid proxy and Uni-
versal Forwarders (see Figure 1.9). These environments are very expensive and
therefore were limited only to above selected instanced to proof the concept
and their goal wasn’t mimic the real production data. Palo Alto Firewall
and Squid must have been configured properly in order to log the required
information. Configuration details are outside of the scope of this thesis.
Fully qualified domain name indicators have not been tested as Amazon
Web Services logs are not available. However, domain names can be extracted
from the URL with using the regular expression like:
http[s]*:\\/\\/[www.]*(?P<url\_domain>[\\w\\W\d]*?)[\\/\"]
However, as it is extracted from the proxy logs, it won’t test any specific cases.
For that, data from DNS server should be leveraged.
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4.1 TOR
In order to test detection of the TOR traffic from the inside of the organiz-
ation, TOR browser – the client, has been installed on the Windows Server.
Connection to the publicly available URL have been done (see Figure 4.1).
Figure 4.1: TOR circuit created to anonymize connection to the site
One can see that the first node of the TOR circuit is IP address 95.85.8.226
located in Netherland. To confirm detection of such traffic, Splunk alerts are
reviewed and alert for this IP have been found (see Figure 4.2).
4.2 Ransomware
In order to test detection of the Ransomware communication from inside of
the organization, simulated connections have been made. It was not possible
to intentionally install real ransomware into the cloud environment. Con-
nection to the malicious URL have been made (see Figure 2.9) from the lab
environments17,18
Splunk alerts are reviewed and alert for this IP have been found (see
Figure 4.3 4.4).
On the figure 4.3 it is possible to see that the correlation search has found
the malicious connection to the http://uuianqwjmdmn.eu/main.php. Because
this indicator was not derived, it has the full confidence equals nine.
On the figure 4.4 it is possible to see two types of situations. First one
is displaying connection to the server that hosts the malicious URL from the
figure 4.3. As this indicator is enriched, the confidence is only six. From this
dashboard, it is possible to see that the server hosting http://uuianqwjmdmn.eu/main.php
is also hosting another three sites that are reported as malicious. That helps
incident response team to get the broader context to the event.
17http://uuianqwjmdmn.eu/main.php
18Connection to the server hosting malicious URL: 95.85.8.226
64
4.2. Ransomware
Fi
gu
re
4.
2:
R
es
ul
ts
of
th
e
Sp
lu
nk
co
rr
el
at
io
n
se
ar
ch
th
at
ha
s
fo
un
d
ou
tb
ou
nd
T
O
R
tr
affi
c
th
at
we
ha
ve
sim
ul
at
ed
65
4. Testing
Figure
4.3:
R
ansom
ware
-C
2
-com
m
unication
detected
to
m
alicious
site
Figure
4.4:
R
ansom
ware
-C
2
-com
m
unication
detected
to
enriched
IPv4
address
66
4.3. Phishing
The second situation is the tested IP address 104.154.199.132 where it
is possible to see that it hosts two URLs that are reported as malicious and
therefore the communication with this server has been detected and alerted.
4.3 Phishing
In order to detect access to sites that are reported for their phishing or ma-
licious activities, simulated connections have been made. Simulated phishing
email was sent and the obfuscated URL hyperlink was opened. Redirection
was made to the malicious site (see Figure 2.10). This site19 has represented
user accessing phishing website (see Figure 2.10).
Figure 4.5: Simulated access to the phishing website
Correlation searches have found this attempt and triggered the alert. Alert
is reviewed in the Splunk dashboard.
On the figure 4.6 it is possible to see that the correlation search has found
the malicious connection to the 20. Because this indicator was not derived, it
has the full confidence equals nine.
On the figure 4.7 it is possible to see two types of situations. First one
is displaying connection to the server that hosts the malicious URL from the
figure 4.6. As this indicator is enriched, the confidence is only six.
The second situation displays a false positive situation. It confirms how
important is to lower confidence when deriving new indicators from the ori-
ginal indicator. It is possible to see that communication to 216.58.216.174
have been alerted because this server is hosting multiple URLs that has been
reported as malicious. However, this IP address belongs to the Google Inc.
and their services have been abused to host malicious or phishing content.
19http://cicak2.com.au/assets/74c5d34d/webmail.html
20Refer to footnote 14
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Conclusion
The goal of the thesis was to analyze the problems of threat intelligence.
This has been done according to the best practices used in the industry and
also using the information within academia. For the purpose of this thesis, the
threat intelligence and all the related terms were defined using these resources.
According to the analysis, the suitable platform has been selected. The
focus was on leveraging the platform that is used in the real-world environ-
ments. Furthermore, another focus was to keep the solution as open as pos-
sible. This has been achieved by using one of the leading Security Information
and Event Management platform (Splunk) that at the same time is publicly
available for the limited time or developer purpose. Another issue has arisen
during the analysis, specifically how to collect, store, normalize and enrich
threat intelligence data. There were two distinct approaches, either to create
a solution from scratch or to leverage publicly available solution. The second
approach was chosen in the form of Threat Intelligence Management platform
that has been further integrated into the solution presented by this thesis.
These platforms were integrated to cover the whole Threat Intelligence cycle
(i.e., Requirements, Collection, Analysis, Production, Evaluation). The result
of the integration provides the complex platform that enables utilization of
the threat intelligence. This platform is based on tools that are open-source
or free for certain period of time.
Another goal was to propose suitable correlation algorithms (searches)
that would enhance the threat detection capabilities of the selected platform
(Splunk). After analysis, following use cases have been selected:
• The Onion Router Traffic (TOR)
• Ransomware
• Phishing
The intention was to detect such communication, access or threat in the
organization’s various network traffic logs. These correlation algorithms were
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designed and then integrated into the platform. Integrated correlation al-
gorithms have been validated with the simulated data in the lab environment.
The validation was successful – malicious traffic has been detected according
to the use cases. On the top of the thesis requirements, correlation algorithms
have been validated with data from the production environment. In this envir-
onment, TOR traffic and phishing attempts have been successfully detected.
Splunk Enterprise is free for limited use and it does not provide any detec-
tion capabilities as the ones mentioned above. This thesis provides the solution
that can provide enhancement of platform capabilities. These enhancements
are free to extend and opened for usage.
On the top of the thesis, additional goals were set by the author. That
has included making the design and realization generic enough so its parts can
be further used as proof of concept, template or guidance to further improve-
ments. This was achieved by using a threat intelligence cycle model in all
chapters. At the same time, the goal was to bring the solution with regards to
the production requirements and trends in the cyber security. That was also
achieved by setting proper requirements on the architecture and discussion
with experts in various security fields.
Therefore, the solution brought in this thesis can be used as a whole to
enhance detection capabilities using threat intelligence. However, if the organ-
ization already has parts of the threat intelligence cycle in place, parts of this
thesis and concepts used here can be used as a template, guidance or proof
of concept. This concept is currently being implemented into the real-world
production environment as it was proved on the confidential data samples that
can leverage threat intelligence and provide context.
In the future, the solution can be extended by defining and designing new
correlation algorithms. It can be also enhanced by integrating another type
of threat intelligence.
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